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The Medical Ethics of “Mira-
cle Max” 
Miracle Max, it seems, is the only remaining miracle worker in all of Florin. 
Among other things, this means that he (unlike anyone else) can resurrect the 
recently dead, at least in certain circumstances. Max’s peculiar talents come 
with significant perks (as Fezzik and Inigo discover, he can basically set his 
own prices!), but they also raise a number of ethical dilemmas that range from 
the merely amusing to the truly perplexing: 
 How much about Max’s “methods” does he need to reveal to his 
patients? Is it really OK for Max to lie about Valerie’s being a witch, 
even though she really isn’t? Just how much of the “truth” does Max 
have to tell his patients? 
 Let’s suppose that Humperdinck had offered Max his old job back. 
Would it have been OK  for Max to accept this offer? What about if 
Humperdinck wanted him to do experiments at “the Zoo”?  
 Is Max obligated to offer his services to everyone who needs them, 
such as the (mostly) dead Westley and friends? Or is free to pick and 
choose? 
In this chapter, I’ll consider how these questions might be addressed using 
concepts of medical ethics. As it turns out, Max’s dilemmas are not too dif-
ferent from the sorts of dilemmas that many medical professionals encounter 
in their daily lives, and exploring how Max could (or should) respond to them 
can help us figure out what we can do here in the “real” world. 
1 HEROES AND VILLAINS: WHAT IS ETH-
ICS ALL ABOUT? 
In its broadest sense, ethics is simply the study of “right” and “wrong” behav-
ior, and medical ethics is the study of ethical issues that arise in the context of 
medicine and biomedical research. The philosophical study of ethics goes (at 
least) all the way back to ancient Greek thinkers such as Socrates (469-399 
BCE), Plato (429-347 BCE), and Aristotle (384-322 BCE). Their contempo-
rary Hippocrates (460-370 BCE) even seems to have been interested in med-
ical ethics in particular, and inspired the “Hippocratic Oath” still taken by 
medical professionals today. 
Before going on any further, though, it’s important to make a distinction be-
tween two very different sorts of ethical questions: “How, as a matter of fact, 
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does a particular person or group actually think about right and wrong be-
havior?” and “Are these judgements correct or incorrect—that is, how ought 
this person or group to act?” The first sort of question is the domain of de-
scriptive ethics, while the second belongs to normative ethics. So, for example, 
consider Prince Humperdink. Descriptively, it seems safe to say that “Hum-
perdinkian ethics” allows things such as the kidnapping and murdering of 
spouses, the construction of giant torture machines, and the instigation of 
wars with neighboring countries, so long as such actions advance one’s career 
goals. As a matter of normative ethics, however, Humperdink’s actions are 
simply wrong—these are surely not the sort of things a decent person ought 
to do!  
The distinction between normative and descriptive ethics will prove valuable 
to us when we start to consider Miracle Max. It is, for example, a matter of 
simple economics that Max can get away with charging a very high price for 
his services—after all, the services he offers (such as raising the dead) are 
highly valuable ones, and he is the only person who is able to offer them (talk 
about a monopoly!). With this in mind, we could look at the prices Max ac-
tually charges and simply describe Max’s ethics when it comes to pricing Does 
he charge rich people more than poor people? Pretty people more than ugly 
ones? Heroes more than villains? If we did this, we would be engaging in 
descriptive ethics. In general, however, we’ll be more interested in answering 
questions about normative ethics: for example, how much should Max charge 
various people, and how should he determine this? 
In order to address these sorts of normative, ethical questions, we’ll be adopt-
ing an influential view called “Principilism,” which was defended by Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress in their book Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 
On this view, medical professionals (such as Max) can improve their ability 
to make ethical decisions in particular cases by applying four fundamental 
principles: autonomy, nonmalfeasance, beneficence, and justice. Moreover, a 
working knowledge of these principles is valuable not just for medical pro-
fessionals, but for anybody who wants to think clearly about what it means 
“to do the right thing” as patients, caregivers, voters, and citizens more gen-
erally.   
  
2 LIES, LIES, LIES: SOME VIOLATIONS OF 
PATIENT AUTONOMY 
When Inigo and Fezzik first go to seek Max’s aid, he isn’t entirely honest. He 
begins by implying that he can’t help (he can), states that his wife Valerie is a 
witch (she isn’t), tells Valerie they’ve offered 20 gold pieces (they offered 65), 
claims that Westley is saying “to blove [bluff]” (he’s saying “true love”), and 
assures them the miracle pill will last for 60 minutes (it will only last 40). He 
lies, in short, to both his patients and the other members of his medical team, 
and doesn’t tell the heroes that (due to medical error) the miracle pill won’t 
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last as long as he’d originally said. While many of these lapses are understand-
able, given Max’s low self-esteem and rusty skills, they serve as examples on 
an all-too-common dilemma in medical ethics: just what sorts of information 
should a medical professional reveal to patients?  
These questions all pertain to the Principle of Autonomy, which states that 
medical professionals should respect and support the abilities of competent 
patients to make their own decisions about treatment. Among other things, 
this means that the medical professional needs to accurately describe the diag-
nosis, prognosis, and possible treatments to the patient. While everything 
turns out OK for Max in the end, he makes a few mistakes along the way. 
First, he exaggerates Valerie’s skill (by saying she’s a witch) and then radically 
downplays his chance of success because of his fear of failure. While Max’s 
failings here are comic, his motivations for lying (a “harmless” exaggeration of 
a colleague’s skill, a sense of risk aversion overly focused on preserving pro-
fessional pride) are, unfortunately, all too realistic, and they can easily be the 
sorts of things that cause medical professionals to mislead patients. 
Ideally, of course, a medical professional could meet the demands of auton-
omy by sitting down with a patient, explaining the proposed treatment in 
detail, and having the patient give his or her verbal or written informed consent. 
In practice, however, this is often impossible. For one thing, patients are of-
ten unconscious, as Westley is when Fezzik and Inigo bring him in. In addi-
tion, patients who are conscious may be unable to understand the proposed 
treatment. By the time we encounter him in The Princess Bride, for example, it 
may well be that old King Lotharon (Max’s old employer) is simply incapable 
of making autonomous choices about his own treatment. Finally, even if pa-
tients are both conscious and capable of understanding, there may be some 
other factor that prevents them from making their own choices. So, for exam-
ple, it seems unlikely that Max really ought to go along with patients’ requests 
if he suspected these requests were due to mental incapacitation (Fezzik’s 
getting hit in head with a rock, Inigo’s still being drunk) or because of external 
threats (perhaps Vizzini has tricked them, or Humperdink threatened them). 
In cases where a patient’s autonomy is compromised by any of these factors, 
the medical professional will have to rely (as Max does) on the decisions of 
surrogates, and on what was known of the patient’s wishes back when they were 
capable of making decisions. In the case of Westley, this is thankfully not too 
difficult—the treatment Fezzik and Inigo propose (saving Westley’s life) 
seems to be clearly in the patient’s best interest, a fact that Max is able to 
confirm by asking the (deceased) Westley what is worth living for. In many 
other cases, unfortunately, matters are not always so clear-cut, and medical 
professionals may need to carefully consider how to weigh seemingly con-
flicting evidence about what the patient “really wanted.”  
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3 WHY WORKING FOR HUMPERDINK IS A 
BAD IDEA 
The idea that medical professionals should respect and promote the ability 
of patients to make their own, autonomous decisions is of a relatively recent 
vintage. By contrast, the idea that they should avoid harming patients is a very 
old, going back (at least) to the Hippocratic Oath, with its promise to “do no 
harm.” In the language of Principilism, this is called the Principle of Non-
malfeasance. One can violate this principle either by directly harming others 
through one’s actions (Count Rugen killing Inigo’s father), or by negligently 
allowing a person to be harmed when it was your responsibility to prevent 
this (Yellin not doing anything when Humperdink reveals his plan to murder 
Buttercup). 
In the case of Westley, of course, Max is at little risk of directly causing harm 
(Westley is already dead, after all). However, it is  worth exploring what exactly 
Max was morally required to do, once he recognizes that Westley has slipped 
from being “somewhat dead” to “mostly dead.” Somewhat surprisingly, ac-
cording to many traditional interpretations of “do no harm,” Max was re-
quired to do almost nothing for Westley, even if he’s already signed on as his 
physician. For example, one traditional view holds that while medical profes-
sionals should never “withdraw” life-saving treatment (no taking the miracle 
pill out of Westley’s mouth), they are perfectly free to “withhold” it (not giv-
ing the miracle pill in the first place). Another common view states that while 
Max’s killing Westley would be wrong, there would be nothing wrong with 
Max “letting him die,” even if there were measures that could save him. A 
third proposal requires that Max provide Westley with “ordinary treatment” 
(perhaps CPR?), but not that he undertake “extraordinary treatment” (a cat-
egory that surely includes miracle pills). 
While these sorts of guidelines may provide certain psychological benefits for 
physicians by making things “simple”, Max’s experience suggests that they 
may be bad ways of thinking about nonmalfeasance, and on what it means to 
avoid harming patients. Instead, it seems that, if we have good reasons (as Max 
does), to think that a treatment could work for a patient (and that the patient 
would consent to it), then the treatment ought to be attempted. Conversely, 
if a treatment will not help (or if a patient does not or would not consent to 
it), it should be stopped or withdrawn.  
Another application of the Principle of Nonmalfeasance concerns its appli-
cation to medical research. What should Max say, for instance, if Humperdink 
were to offer his old job back, but on the condition that he carry out experi-
ments at the Zoo of Death? This would surely involve harming both humans 
and animals, and so it would clearly violate the principle. However, this does 
not (by itself) entail that Max ought to refuse. After all, he would need to 
consider the possibility that the violation of nonmalfeasance was outweighed 
by patient autonomy (if human research subjects gave informed consent) or 
by the goal of beneficence (if animal experimentation promised some great 
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benefit). In the case of the Zoo, of course, neither of these criteria are met, 
since Humperdink’s and Rugen’s main interest seems to be in inflicting as 
much pain as possible. In the real world, however, these three principles 
would need to be carefully weighed against each other, both by individual 
professionals such as Max and by the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) 
commonly called upon to determine the ethics of proposed research. 
4 MAX THE BENEFICENT  
When Inigo and Fezzik go to seek Max’s aid, they are able to offer Max a 
hefty sum of gold for his services, a fact that goes a long way toward over-
coming Max’s initial reluctance to help. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that 
the average resident of Florin could afford this price, even though they could 
definitely make use of Max’s services. So, what should Max do when these 
people show up at his door, asking for help, but with no way to pay? Or what 
about when he is out for a walk, and he encounters a mostly dead person on 
the side of the road? Is he required to stop and help, or is this going above 
and beyond the call of duty? 
In Principilism, questions such as this fall under the Principle of Beneficence, 
which requires medical professionals to take positive action to benefit others, 
or to prevent them from being harmed. In very general terms, the principle 
says that we are obligated to help people when (1) we notice they are at risk 
of major harm, (2) we think it is likely we can help them without too much 
cost or risk to ourselves, and (3) all things considered, it seems that our ac-
tions will do more good than harm. This principle would imply, for example, 
that Max ought to help a recently dead person he finds by the side of the road, 
should he have a soon-to-expire miracle pill in his pocket, and no particular 
plans for it. By contrast, Inigo and Fezzik are clearly going above and beyond 
the Principle of Beneficence when they put themselves in danger by rescuing 
Westley from the Zoo. Similarly, Westley’s “as you wish” agreement to all of 
Buttercup’s demands at the beginning of the book goes well beyond the sort 
of beneficence he would owe to a random stranger (though perhaps not to 
the love of his life). 
Beneficence becomes even trickier when it conflicts with other principles, or 
when actions that have good consequences for some people have bad effects 
for others. So, let’s say that Valerie has developed a new miracle pill that she 
would like Max to test. When people hear about this (even more miraculous!) 
pill, they will surely be eager to try it. However, in order for Valerie and Max 
to figure out whether or not this pill works, they will have to test it rigorously. 
And in order to do this, it may be that they can’t give it to everyone—instead, 
they’ll have to give it to some people (the “experimental group”), while deny-
ing it to others (the “control group”) in order to compare the outcomes and 
see what happens. In this case, it seems like beneficence toward the large 
number of future patients who would benefit from the new pill will sometimes 
trump beneficence toward the one or two particular patients who might ben-
efit now.  
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In other cases, beneficence may conflict with respect for autonomy, non-
malfeasance, or both; as when a patient refuses to undergo a painful proce-
dure that could save their life. So, for example, suppose the King refused to 
take a life-saving miracle pill on the grounds that it “gave him a stomach-
ache.” In this scenario, it seems like Max should at least consider tricking the 
King into taking into it (perhaps by sticking it in ice cream?). As with many 
“tough” cases in medical ethics, there may simply be no hard-and-fast “rule” 
about how such cases ought to be decided. 
5 FIXING FLORIN’S HEALTHCARE PROB-
LEMS 
As the only remaining miracle worker in Florin, Max is in a peculiar position: 
his decisions to treat (or not treat) patients are (quite literally) matters life or 
death. So, for example, if he had not agreed to treat Westley, then Westley 
would have remained dead—the heroes simply had no other options. Given 
this monopoly on health care, how should Max distribute his efforts? Should 
he simply treat whoever pays the best? Charge a set price and do “first-come 
first-serve?” Or something else? 
These sorts of “who gets medical care?” dilemmas fall under the auspices of 
the Principle of Justice, which says that people should “get what they de-
serve.” Among other things, this means that people should not be denied med-
ical care because they happen to have certain disadvantageous properties 
(such as being born a giant, or having your father killed by an evil count) that 
they had no control over. Conversely, it says that people with undeserved 
advantageous properties (such as being born a prince) do not deserve privileged 
access to medical care. Just as with the other principles, it is highly unlikely 
that we could ever be “perfectly” just, since doing so would almost certainly 
involve substantial violations autonomy, nonmalfeasance, or beneficence. 
Nevertheless, the principle requires that we “aspire” toward justice, even if 
this (sometimes) means making sacrifices in other areas. 
So what does this mean for Max? Depending on one’s theory of justice, one 
might hold that Max is free to sell his services to the highest bidder (libertar-
ianism) or, conversely, that is he is required to provide his service (perhaps 
free of charge) solely on what he thinks would be most “health-promoting” 
(utilitarianism). However, there are problems with these extreme views, since 
the first option would say Max has no duties to anyone in Florin, while the 
second option would say he has no right to a spend any time on anything 
else. A more palatable proposal might involve Max balancing a commitment 
to doing something for the poorer citizens of Florin, while also reserving some 
of his time and resources for higher-paying clients (and for spending time 
with Valerie!).  
In the real world, of course, ensuring “justice” is largely a matter for large 
governmental or health-care institutions, and not for individual providers 
such as Max. However, Max’s simplified case brings out a number of issues 
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relevant to debates about justice in health care. For example, the Principle of 
Justice seems to imply that people do have a right to a basic level of health 
care, even if this requires others to make sacrifices. However, because re-
sources are limited (and because citizens have priorities besides health care), 
it seems implausible that people have a right to unlimited health care. Ideally, 
then, Max might recommend to Humperdink that he finance the training of 
some new miracle-workers, and that he put some money aside toward man-
ufacturing miracle pills for those in need of them. Florinese politics being 
what they are, however, it seems likely that Max may well have to content 
himself with treating the occasional wounded adventurer. 
6 TOO MUCH OR NOT ENOUGH? 
So, what would Max think of our four rules? Given the (sometimes question-
able) state of his memory, he might ask if we could somehow simplify 
things—maybe just include three rules, or two rules, or even just one? Con-
versely, he might ask why we needed principles at all—why not just figure 
things out on a case-by-case basis? While these objections both have long 
philosophical pedigrees, there are real advantages to adopting Principilism. 
First, in allowing for a larger number of principles (as opposed to just one), 
we can account for the fact that questions in medical ethics problems are 
often complex (they can’t be solved by “mechanically” applying a single rule), 
and they may be genuine dilemmas (with no clearly correct answer). Second, 
in positing there are some general principles that stay the same between cases, 
we can actually “learn from experience” by identifying specific commonalities 
between cases. So, while Max’s experiences in Florin differ wildly from those 
of most real-world medical professionals, the principles used to assess them 
are the same, a fact that allows us to learn from Max’s failures and success.  
In the end, the value of Principilism (as with any theory of normative ethics) 
lies in what it allows us to do with it, and in what problems it enables us to 
solve. In this respect, it is precisely the fact that Principilism allows us to learn 
something relevant to solving new moral problems by considering the out-
come of previous or hypothetical cases that makes it so valuable. And this is 
possible only because Principilism attempts neither to reduce morality to a 
single, mechanical rule nor to throw out rule-based reasoning altogether.  So, 
while Florin is (unfortunately, and despite my childhood confusion about this 
point) a fictional place, this doesn’t mean that The Princess Bride has nothing 
“real” to offer us. 
